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vs. 





F. C. STANGL, III, 
Third-Party 
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Case No. 14105 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT F. C. STANGL, III 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, F. C. Stangl, III, brought suit to 
foreclose a mechanics lien for construction work per-
formed by him on a proposed high-rise apartment complex 
at Second Avenue and Canyon Road in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and defendants Burton M. Todd and E. Keith Lignell 
counterclaimed for damages for breach of a construc-
tion contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court ruled in favor of defendants 
on their counterclaim, finding that plaintiff had 
breached a contract to build the Canyon Road apartment 
complex. Though the projected complex was never built, 
the trial court ruled that the proper measure of damages 
was its cost of completion and awarded damages to the 
defendants in the amount of $340,877. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an order of this court that 
(1) vacates the judgment of the trial court in favor 
of defendants, (2) holds that there was no enforceable 
contract between the parties, and (3) enters judgment 
in plaintiff's favor in the amount of $40,876.55 for 
the value of work performed by him. In the alternative, 
plaintiff seeks an order remanding the case and direct-
ing the trial court to determine damages, if any, 
based upon the fair market value of the apartment com-
plex had it been completed. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
In early 1972, defendants Burton M. Todd and 
E. Keith Lignell, who had previously developed several 
apartment house projects in the Salt Lake area (R. 315), 
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decided to build an apartment complex at Canyon Road 
and Second Avenue in Salt Lake City. They hired 
Ronald L. Molen as their architect and Mr. Molen recom-
mended plaintiff F. C. Stangl, III as an experienced 
contractor capable of building the project (R. 3 26). 
Plaintiff, defendants and Mr. Molen met in April, 1972 
(R. 325) to get acquainted and discuss the project in 
general terms, but thereafter plaintiff had very little 
involvement in the project until June of 1972. In the 
interim the architect prepared preliminary plans and 
elevation sketches indicating the basic size and con-
figuration of a 183-unit apartment project (Ex. 6, 7-D). 
In June of 1972, Dr. Todd asked plaintiff to 
prepare a cost estimate to submit to a prospective lend-
ing institution (R. 367-68). Plaintiff, using the 
preliminary plans (Ex. 74~D), prepared a cost break-
down sheet (Ex. 11-D) itemizing expenses for various 
categories of construction components in the project. 
He submitted this sheet to Dr. Todd along with a letter 
(Ex. 52-P) outlining how the project should be built. 
The letter stated: 
"As you know, it is impossible to give an 
exact bid to construct anything without having 
exact plans to correlate the costs to the 
object being purchased. However, using the 
construction management method, I have been able 
to give a prospective owner a preliminary pro-
posal indicating a basic type of construction 
project and this together with my initial 
participation in the engineering and selection 
of specified materials, has enabled me to 
build over 100 projects of various types for 
various owners and hold 100% to the budget 
projected in the preliminary proposal." 
(Ex. 52-P)(emphasis added) 
The cost shown on the breakdown sheet was $2,359,000. 
Several items were added, increasing the total price 
to $2,399,222 (Ex. 12-D, R. 312). Dr. Todd used 
these figures to obtain permanent financing on the 
project in the amount of $2,350,000 (Ex. 20-D). 
Because their loan commitment was to expire 
by October 15 unless construction had started, defend-
ants urged plaintiff to begin work. An agreement was 
executed by the parties on or about the expiration date.—' 
Attached to the agreement were the General Conditions 
and the Supplementary General Conditions, a copy of 
the July 11 letter (Ex. 52-P), a typed copy of the cost 
breakdown sheet (Ex. 12-P), and two blank exhibit pages. 
Subparagraph (e) of Section 1.1 of the 
contract defined the contract to be: 
1. The agreement of October 15; 
2. The General Conditions, Supplementary 
Conditions, and the plans and specifi-
cations as developed. 2/ 
V«rhere is sane confusion in the record as to precisely 
when the document was executed. The contract was executed in dupli-
cate; one copy bears the date of October 18 (Ex. 1-P), another copy 
bears the date of October 12 (R. 400). 
2/ln Article IX the phrase "plans and specifications as 
developed" is used again. Here, however, there is added the paren-
thetical expression "See Article II", suggesting that the plans and 
specifications are to be developed according to provisions of 
Section 2.2. 
Section 2.2 provides: 
"The parties hereto agree that Contractor has 
prepared the contract price based upon prelim-
inary plans and specifications prepared by 
Ronald Molen, AIA. Detailed working drawings 
have not yet been finally prepared. Contractor 
and Architect shall work together in preparation 
of final drawings and with the approval of 
Architect and Owner, Contractor shall have the 
right to specify materials to be used. The 
letter [July 11, Ex. 52-P] attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C" with its attached cost breakdown, 
sets forth types of materials to be specified 
in the final plans and working drawings and 
also a cost breakdown of items in the project. 
Any deviation from the items specified in the 
letter shall cause an adjustment in the price 
as set forth on the attachment." (emphasis added) 
The second paragraph of Section 2.2 recites that the 
parties intend that the contractor shall build both a 
twelve-story and a nine-story apartment building, a 
commons area, and both a two- and three-level parking 
ramp. The project was to conform to all building codes 
and applicable laws and the apartments were to be of 
a quality equal to that prevailing in the $150 to $250 
per month rental range. The last sentence of Section 
2.2 once again reiterates the plaintiff's right to 
specify construction materials. 
"Contractor shall, with the approval of 
the Architect, choose the specific materials 
to be used in construction in accordance with 
the attached letter (Exhibit 'C')." (emphasis 
added)!/ 
y The contractor's right to specify materials is re-
emphasized in Section 2.3: 
"The Contractor shall have complete control over 
the project and over the subcontractors hired to 
work on the project." 
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At or about the time the agreement 
was executed, plaintiff began work on the project. 
The site was cleared, existing structures 
were demolished and removed (R. 17), land was exca-
vated (R. 17), footings were poured and much 
of the steel re-bar necessary for the foundations 
was put in place (R. 18). By December, plaintiff 
was ready to pour the large concrete slab 
that was to form the foundation of the east tower 
of the complex. On or about December 28, bad 
weather set in, making it impossible to complete the 
concrete pouring and work stopped on the project 
(R* 24-25). The reasonable value of the work, as 
found by the court, was $40,896 (R. 1575). 
When construction began, final drawings 
had not been prepared. In early July, Molen's 
office began work on the drawings beginning with 
one of the parking ramps (R. 946) . Plans for 
this ramp were probably completed in late August, 
1972 (R. 949). In September, the engineer, Ralph 
Wadsworth, also made drawings of different possible 
floor structures as part of an analysis to deter-
mine the flooring to be used (Ex. 100-D, 
R. 1265). Work on the basic plans, especially those 
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for the east tower, progressed throughout September 
and October. A partial set of drawings was completed 
on or about November 3 (Ex. 78-D). The record is not 
clear as to the exact status of the plans throughout 
October and November. The evidence indicated that 
throughout their preparation there were extensive 
revisions and changes being drawn into the plans 
(R. 950-1006, Ex. 89, 92, 94-D). The drawings were 
not, however, put into final form, nor were specifica-
tions prepared, until February, 1973. 
During the drawing of the plans, questions 
began to arise about the construction items and mater-
ials being included. Among those items were materials 
and details that defendants conceded, and the court 
later found, were beyond the scope of the October 
agreement. Although the court labeled these items as 
"extras" (Finding No. 5, R. 1574), in no case was a 
written change order signed by the defendants nor was 
the required 30 percent of the additional cost of any 
"extra" paid or even agreed to be paid (Ex. 1-P). 
By early January, as bids and estimates were 
coming in from subcontractors, it became clear that 
the project as drawn by the architect, including those 
items later deemed "extras", was going to cost more 
than the contract price. The parties had several meet-
ings during January, 1973, during which defendants 
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insisted that plaintiff build the project at the 
original contract price, although the plans in exist-
ence at that time included a number of items not 
included in the plans in existence on October 15, 
1972 (R. 419-427). At one of these meetings, plain-
tiff presented a cost breakdown sheet (Ex. 13-D), 
reflecting the bids and estimates he was receiving. 
The sheet revealed a cost, excluding any profit for 
plaintiff, of approximately $2, 700,000. This sheet 
indicated that it was a "revised estimate for compo-
nent items as per corrected plans plus modifications" 
(Ex. 13-D). Additions, deletions and changes in the 
plans were discussed, but the parties were unable to 
resolve their differences. At these January meetings, 
defendants stated that the cost estimates were 
unacceptable because defendants did not have additional 
funds to commit to the project and that it was impera-
tive that the original contract price of $2*4 million 
be maintained (R. 422). 
When Mr. Molen completed the final plans and 
specifications in February (Ex. 9, 10-D), defendants 
solicited bids from various contractors. Unlike the 
estimate prepared by plaintiff in June and attached to 
the October 15 agreement, these bid proposals were 
based on complete and final plans and specifications 
and did not contemplate a construction management project 
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where the contractor p a r t i c i p a t e s in the preparat ion 
of plans and spec i f ica t ion of ma te r i a l s . P l a in t i f f 
was among those asked to bid (Ex. 14-D). His bid 
was $3.4 mi l l ion , with a l l other bids being higher 
(R. 435, 446). Since the cost of the project was 
grea t ly in excess of the o r ig ina l contrac t p r i c e , and 
since the plans were subs tan t i a l ly d i f fe ren t from the 
plans as of October 15, 1972, p l a i n t i f f refused to 
resume const ruct ion. 
On March 21, 1973, a l e t t e r dated March 7, 
over the s ignature of defendants1 a t to rney , was sent 
to p l a i n t i f f a s se r t ing t h a t p l a i n t i f f was in defaul t 
and demanding tha t he proceed with construct ion and 
build the project for the o r ig ina l contract pr ice 
(Ex. 56-P, R. 30). A few days l a t e r , p l a i n t i f f f i led 
a mechanics l i en on the property, claiming the value 
of the work he performed (Ex. 3-P). Shortly t h e r e -
a f t e r , s u i t was f i l ed to foreclose the l i e n . Defend-
ants answered the complaint and counterclaimed, seek-
ing damages for p l a i n t i f f ' s purported breach of the 
construct ion agreement.1/ 
V Marathon Steel Company, a subcontractor supplying 
ironwork on the project, also filed suit against defendants 
Burton M. Todd and E. Keith Lignell for the value of the goods 
and services which i t delivered to the project. In this action, 
plaintiff was joined as a third-party defendant. The two cases 
were consolidated (R. 1859). Prior to t r i a l , Marathon Steel 
Gompany was dismissed as a party. Joined as a party defendant 
in the original lien foreclosure suit was Pacific Slope Develop-
ment which was pursuant to stipulation dismissed as a party (R. 1820). 
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On the final day of a nearly three week 
trial, the trial court ruled from the bench that 
plaintiff had breached his contract to build the 
Canyon Road project. The Findings of Fact do not 
specify of what the breach consisted nor when it 
occurred, other than to say that on or about January 
15, 1973, plaintiff refused to perform further work 
on the contract (Finding No. 9, R. 1575). Though the 
contemplated project was never completed, the trial 
court, again from the bench, awarded damages based 
upon the estimated cost of completion. The court 
found a breach of contract in January and found that, 
as of January, the cost to complete the project would 
have been $2.7 million (Ex. 13-D), less work already 
done. To this figure the court added 10 percent for 
the contractor's presumed profit, thereby obtaining a 
total cost of completion figure of $2,97 0,450. From 
this figure the original contract price of $2,399,220 
was subtracted. From the resulting figure, $40,876, 
representing the value of plaintiff's work, was sub-
tracted along with $189,475 for "extras", consisting 
of items which defendants admitted were not part of 
the original construction agreement. The resulting 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
PARTIES EVER REACHED AN AGREEMENT SUFFICIENTLY 
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFF BREACHED. 
A. The Evidence Is Clear that the Parties 
Never Agreed on a Contract Price. 
The intent and language of the October agree-
ment are clear: The parties acknowledged that the 
contract price was based upon preliminary plans, that 
detailed working drawings were yet to be prepared, and 
that the parties expressly assumed the obligation of 
working together to prepare final plans and specifica-
tions. The contractor was unambiguously given the 
right to specify the construction materials subject 
only to the approval of the architect and the defendant 
owners. 
Section 2.2 specified that the project was to 
be built of the "types of construction materials" out-
lined on the cost breakdown sheet attached to the July 
11 letter (Ex. 11-D, Ex. 52-P). The sheet contains a 
list of 66 categories of construction materials. Some, 
like ornamental iron, are quite specific; most, such as 
painting and plumbing, are very general. In accordance 
with the items listed on the sheet, the October 15 
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agreement permitted plaintiff to specify the partic-
ular construction materials within each of the 66 
categories. Where the category is general, as with 
painting, plaintiff would have considerable latitude 
in specifying the particular type, grade and quality 
of paint. Where the category is more specific, 
plaintiff would have correspondingly less freedom in 
picking the specific building material. Plaintiff 
could not eliminate categories of materials or refuse 
to include certain items in those categories. For 
example, had plaintiff totally refused to include 
security doors or fireplaces, he no doubt would have 
been in breach. Similarly, plaintiff could not 
refuse to include any masonry or plumbing in the 
structure. 
The trial court ruled that on or about 
October 15, 1972, the parties were in "substantial 
agreement as to all material aspects of the buildings 
to be constructed for the fixed price, and plans and 
drawings substantially reflecting their agreement had 
been prepared" (Finding No. 4, R, 1574) (emphasis added). 
The court ruled further that as part of the contract 
the parties had later agreed to "certain specified 
extras for which plaintiff was to be compensated by 
defendants in addition to the agreed [fixed price] 
of $2,399,222", and that "the reasonable worth of 
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said extras was $189,475" (Finding No. 5, R. 1574) 
(emphasis added). 
If the court was correct in holding that 
defendants had agreed to pay $2,399,222 plus $189,475 
or a total of $2,588,697, this fact should be sup-
ported in the record. However, the record is clear 
that the defendants never agreed to pay more than 
$2/399,222 for the project. In fact, the record is 
clear that the defendants were unwilling and unable 
to pay any amounts above the original contract price. 
At a luncheon meeting in April of 1972, 
Dr. Todd stressed the financial constraints within 
which the defendants were working: 
"Q. Now, did you have a discussion with 
respect to the question of whether or not the 
property—correction—project, was to be one 
hundred percent financed? 
A. Right from the inception I tried to 
make this clear to everybody that this would 
have to be a one hundred percent financed project. 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Tanner) You have stated that 
you had discussed this concept from the begin-
ning. Now, my precise question to you is, at 
this lunch which I believe you said was the 
first time you had met Mr. Stangl? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At this lunch, did you say anything 
to Mr. Stangl or Mr. Molen about whether this 
project had to be a hundred percent financed? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you tell them? 
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A. I told them we would have to work out 
a method of completely financing this project. 
We'd do it through a sale lease back on the 
land and that it would have to be able to sus-
tain itself to the value of the mortgage that 
we were able to obtain. 
Q. At that time did you discuss with 
them the reason for your requiring that it be 
one hundred percent self-sustained? 
A. Yes. We mentioned that we actually 
had our hands full with the Incline Terrace 
project and didn't have any additional funds 
to commit to this project. 
Q. Did Mr. Stangl make any statement to 
you that indicated to you in any form that he 
did not understand the implications of your 
requirement respecting one hundred percent 
financing? 
A. No, he didn't." (R. 329-330) 
The defendants obtained financing in the 
amount of $2,350,000, and at all times communicated to 
plaintiff their concern that the contract price approx-
imate this figure. 
"Q. Now, you say about mid-May the [fin-
ancing] figure was pretty well zeroed in on 
this? Now, did you communicate that to Mr. Stangl? 
A, Yes, I did. 
* * * ,, .-v.,, .... 
Q. And this was a pivotal item of course, 
to a hundred percent finance job, wasn't it? 
[Objection overruled] 
DOCTOR TODD: It was very important. And I 
made a point of communicating its importance to 
both Mr. Stangl, the contractor, and Mr. Molen, 
the architect. I was concerned that we all under-
stand the figure that we were working with so 
that we wouldn't have any disputes about it. 
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Q. (By Mr. Tanner) And by disputes, 
what did you mean? 
A. Well, sometimes these projects tend 
to get out of hand. The costs go up. And 
I wanted it clearly understood just exactly 
how much money there was to work with. 
Q. And so you communicated? 
A. I did. 
Q. On more than one occasion? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Communicated to whom, 
Mr. Stangl? 
DOCTOR TODD: To both Mr. Stangl and to 
Mr. Molen. 
THE COURT: All right." (R. 366-67) 
If there was in fact a meeting of the minds, 
as required by basic contract law, it must necessarily 
have included a contract price. This contract price 
could not have been $2,399,222 because that would 
contradict the court's critical holding that the 
parties had agreed to certain specified extras for 
which plaintiff was to be compensated by defendants 
in addition to the agreed [fixed] price of $2,399,222. 
Nor could this contract price have been $2,588,697 
(the fixed price plus the "specified extras") because 
defendants, by their own admissions, were unable and 
unwilling to pay more than $2,399,222. Dr. Todd 
testified that at the time of the January meeting he 
"thought everything was tied down" (R. 421-22), and 
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t ha t a t a subsequent meeting a few days l a t e r with 
Mr. Stangl and Mr. Molen he s ta ted to Mr. Molen 
tha t he considered Mr. Stangl obl igated to perform 
at the o r ig ina l cont rac t p r i c e : * 
"Mr. S tang l ' s got a de f in i t e r e spons ib i l i t y 
in t h i s regard because we have committed 
ourselves on the bas is of h is f igures . 
Wefve got some rea l problems if we c a n ' t 
get these costs in where they were." (R. 423) 
(emphasis added) 
Dr, Todd t e s t i f i e d t ha t the purpose of t h i s meeting 
was to see i f the costs could be "realigned or brought 
down and brought in to focus and brought back to the 
figure we had been t a lk ing about o r ig ina l l y " (R. 422) 
(emphasis added).—' I t must be remembered tha t t h i s 
"or ig ina l" f igure was $2,3 99 mi l l ion , not the $2,589 
mil l ion tha t the t r i a l court found defendants were 
obligated to pay a t tha t t ime. The inescapable con-
clusion must be t ha t there was no agreement as to 
p r i ce . 
Obviously the c o u r t ' s theory as to the 
"cer ta in specif ied ex t ras" con f l i c t s with defendants ' 
counse l ' s theory in March of 1973. At t ha t t ime, 
V In response to a question concerning why the 
defendants did not proceed with the project, Dr. Todd answered: 
"Well, there were several reasons. Number one, we 
didn't have the additional money to build i t . And : 
on the bas i s of the r en t a l project ions which had 
been made, and which we f e l t were maximum, i t wDuld 
have been uneconomical t o expend a g rea te r sum on i t . 
I t would have been an inv i t a t ion t o economic d i s a s t e r . " 
(R. 431) 
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some seven weeks after it became clear the parties 
did not have a meeting of the minds, he wrote to 
plaintiff stating: 
". . . This contract [of October 1972], when 
taken together with your letter of July 11, 
1972, and the many conferences and conversa-
tions between you, Dr« Todd and the architects, 
appears to be sufficiently clear and certain 
to be performed and enforced. 
I am advised that you began construction 
under the agreement and have subsequently 
ceased construction and informed Drs. Todd and 
Lignell that you will not perform the contract 
for the price contained therein. 
Please consider this letter a demand that 
you immediately recommence performance of said 
contract, . . . and perform the construction 
in full compliance with the terms of the con-
tract and its associated documents and for the 
price set forth therein,11 (Ex. 56-P) (emphasis 
added) 
At this time, the only price set forth anywhere was 
the price in the construction agreement, $2,399,222. 
And Dr. Todd himself testified that the only 
"extras" ever discussed were additional bathrooms in 
the "B unit" apartments and the laundry and storage 
area under the lobby (R. 4 06-9). These items were 
only two of twelve items found to be "agreed upon" 
extras by the trial court. 
Dr. Todd did testify later in the proceedings, 
after plaintiff had pointed out that there were exten-
sive and substantial changes in the plans (R. 560-619), 
that many of these changes had come to his attention, 
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and that he considered them "extra" to the agreement 
(R. 1361). But there was no testimony that the 
parties ever reached an agreement concerning these 
"extras" or ever discussed a price for them. The 
costs of these "extras" were in fact "credited" to 
Mr. Stangl and included as part of the contract 
price based upon a valuation of their "reasonable" 
worth (Finding No. 5, R. 1574). This reasonable 
worth was established, for the most part, by the 
testimony of a third-party expert (R. 1420-1444). 
Section 3.1 of the October construction 
agreement sets forth specific procedures for includ-
ing extras in the project. These require change 
orders to be in writing and require 30 percent of 
any additional cost to be paid at the time of the 
change* It is clear from the record that these 
contract procedures were never invoked. 
Indeed the record is clear that the dis-
putes that arose in January concerning the costs of 
erecting the apartment complex involved not only the 
increased costs that Mr. Stangl had run up against, 
but also the substantial extras which defendants 
consistently indicated, both at that time and at 
trial, they were unwilling to pay for. In such cir-
cumstances, it was error to rule that there was ever 
a contract between the parties. They had never 
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agreed on a price. See, e.g., Restatement of 
Contracts, §§ 19, et seq.; Klimek v. Perisich, 
371 P.2d 956 (Ore. 1962). 
' ' B. The Evidence Is Clear that the Parties 
Never Agreed About the Construction Materials and 
Construction Details for the Canyon Road Apartment 
Complex• 
In the language of contract law, the situa-
tion of the parties in October, 1972, was as follows: 
In July, plaintiff made an offer to defen-
dants to build the Canyon Road project for $2,399,222 
if he could control the specification of materials 
and work with the architect in the preparation of 
final plans and specifications. Defendants, with 
minor changes, accepted this offer and the terms of 
this understanding were embodied in the October con-
struction agreement. Thus the parties agreed to 
build the project for the contract price, but there 
was yet no agreement about what the building should 
contain and the agreement of the parties was still 
indefinite and uncertain. 
As stated in Hansen v. Snell, 11 Utah 2d 
64, 354 P.2d 1070 (1960): 
"In order for a contract to be binding, 
it must spell out the obligations of the 
parties with sufficient definiteness that it 
can be performed." (354 P.2d at 1072) See 
also Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 
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P.2d 597 (1962); Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 
Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427 (1961); Owyhee, 
Inc. v, Robbins Marco Polo, 17 Utah 2dTi81, 
407 P.2d 565 (1965) . 
This requirement of certainty has been 
stringently enforced in construction contracts. 
Professor Williston, in his treatise, puts the point 
as follows: 
"As a promise may insufficiently specify 
the price to be paid, so the consideration 
for which the price is to be paid may be left 
equally uncertain, and in such a case it is 
not usually possible to invoke the standard 
of reasonableness in order to give the promise 
sufficient definiteness to make it enforceable. 
Illustrations of such indefiniteness are as 
follows: . . . a promise to erect buildings 
where the dimensions and plans are not speci-
fied, or which refers to plans and specifica-
tions as part of a contract though no plans 
and specifications are attached." (1 Williston 
on Contracts, § 42 at 135-36 (3d Ed. 1957)) 
(emphasis added) 
In Robinson & Wilson, Inc. v. Stone, 110 Cal. 
Rptr, 675, 35 Cal. App. 3d 396 (1974), the contract 
provision in question was: 
"ARTICLE 20. COMPLETION OF UNDESIGNED INTERIORS. 
The total contract price includes the 
sum of $30,040 for the completion of the 
interior for portions of the building, approx-
imately 9,610 square feet, for which work, 
plans and specifications will, in the future, 
be prepared by the architect for the tenants 
concerned. The Contractor will furnish all 
necessary labor and materials to complete and 
finish the said areas generally with the 
materials and to the standards fixed in the 
plans and specifications presently in existence 
for the other areas of the building and speci-
fically may be required by the said tenant's 
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architect and willf accordingly, furnish, 
construct and install the following items: 
. . . ." (35 Cal. App. 3d at 400-01) 
Plans and specifications for the interior of the 
building were transmitted from the defendant owner 
to the plaintiff contractor with the assumption that 
the plaintiff would perform the work for the $30,040 
price. Plaintiff refused to perform the work called 
for by the plans unless he were paid $14 0,000. The 
owners then ordered him off the job and hired other 
contractors to perform the interior work. 
The trial court found that the plaintiff 
had breached and awarded defendants $84,444 on their 
counterclaim. On appeal, the case was reversed. The 
appellate court found the provisions of Article 20 
too indefinite to obligate plaintiff to build the 
interior areas. The court was specifically faced 
with the issue of "extras". As the court stated: 
"Article 20 is also uncertain in other 
essential respects. As interpreted by the 
court, it obligated the contractor to com-
plete the undesigned area in accordance with 
specifications to be provided in the future 
by the tenants for the guaranteed maximum 
contract price plus the reasonable value of 
any 'extra1 work required by the tenants. 
However, there was no evidence as to how the 
'reasonable value' of the 'extras' was to be 
determined, whether it was to be cost plus 
or some other basis. Nor was there certainty 
as to who was to pay for the 'extras'. The 
owners testified it was understood the 
tenants would pay for them. However, the 
tenants, not being parties to the agreement, 
were obviously not bound by any understanding 
between the contractor and the owners. 
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Insofar as it pertained to so-called 
'extras' which may be required by the tenants, 
article 20 was in essence nothing more than a 
promise to agree in the future. If an 
essential element of a promise is reserved for 
future agreement of the parties, the promise 
does not give rise to a legal obligation until 
the further agreement is made." (35 Cal. App. 
3d at 408-9. 
As the point was made in the Idaho case of 
Nave v. McGrane, 19 Idaho 111, 113 P. 82 (1910): 
"If the plans and specifications were not 
definite and certain as to the kinds and quali-
ties of material to be used, the class of work-
manship, etc., the time within which the 
building must be completed, the method of making 
payments and other matters, the bid to construct 
the building would only indicate a willingness 
to negotiate further in regard to the matters 
not specified, and its acceptance would express 
a like willingness, but would not bind either 
party." (113 P. at 85) (emphasis added) 
In Klimek v. Perisich, 371 P.2d 956 (Ore. 
1962), plaintiff brought suit against the defendant 
contractor for an alleged breach of a contract to 
remodel an old dwelling house into a rooming house. 
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff which 
was set aside by the trial court and plaintiff appealed. 
The parties orally agreed that the contractor would 
perform the work at a cost not to exceed $10,000 with 
the understanding that as the required plumbing, heat-
ing or electrical wiring became necessary, such items 
would be contracted for at the most reasonable price 
available. No plans or specifications were agreed 
upon. The court sustained the trial court's finding 
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that the agreement was too indefinite to be enforce-
able and did so for the following reasons: 
"The trial court, in granting judgment 
for the defendant, notwithstanding the verdict 
of the jury, based its opinion on the indefi-
niteness of the subject matter of the offer. 
The plaintiff contends that the subject matter 
of the offer is sufficiently definite in that 
the parties agreed upon a maximum amount to be 
paid by the plaintiff for the remodeling of a 
certain building; that the extent and require-
ments for remodeling were certain, although 
no specifications were agreed upon; that the 
minimum requirements of the building code of 
the city of Portland required certain materials 
to be used, and this supplied the lack of 
specifications as to the work to be done and 
the material to be used by the defendant . . * 
"The difficulty with plaintiff's conten-
tions that the minimal requirements of the city 
building code are sufficiently definite as a 
substitute for specifications is that there is 
no evidence that the parties agreed that com-
pliance with the minimal requirements of the 
building code would constitute a satisfactory 
execution of the purported contract, and also 
there is no evidence that the building code 
specifies the extent of the remodeling, or 
the kinds or types of materials that could be 
satisfactorily used in the remodeling . . . . " 
(371 P.2d at 961) Cf. Halowich v. Amminiti, 
190 Pa. Super. 314, 154 A.2d 406 (1959). 
In Cannady v. Martin, 98 S.W.2d 1009 (Tex. 
App. 1936), the court was faced with the following 
contract provision: 
"It is further agreed and understood that 
said W. I. Cannady and H. E. Cannady agree 
themselves to complete a brick building upon 
lot 13 in said Block No. 85 with ninety 
(90) days from the time they complete the 
building for said J. G. Martin and C. M. 
Martin, and that the west wall of said 
Martin building and the east wall of said 
Cannady building shall be a joint wall, and 
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that said wall shall be on the common line 
of said lots 14 and 13, and shall be half 
on each lot, and that said W. I. Cannady and 
H. E. Cannady are to pay said J. G. Martin 
and C. M. Martin for half of said wall on 
completion of the said building for said 
J. G. Martin and C. M. Martin." 
There was also evidence that there was an oral agree-
ment that the building was to be 25 feet wide by 100 
feet long and a modern brick building of the same 
character as appellees1 and adapted to the use of 
some mercantile establishment. 
The court held that the written portion of 
the contract was too vague and indefinite to be 
enforceable. (See also Greater Houston Suburban Corp. 
v. Dupuy & Mullen, 176 S.W. 668 (Tex. App. 1915); and 
Bissenger v. Price, 117 Ala. 480, 23 S. 67 (1898)). 
In Colorado Corp. v. Smith, 263 P.2d 79 
(Cal. App. 1953), the court was faced with the enforce-
ability of a provision whereby one party had agreed 
"to construct at such time as he chooses a residence 
of not less than 12 00 square feet" on each of the 
parcels of particular property. The court held this 
agreement to be unenforceable for the following
 : 
reasons: > Vi^ c;,^ --
"Obviously the clause by which the 
buyer agreed to construct residences on Gault 
Street was an essential term of the contract; 
it was part of the consideration to the 
Seller for his promise to sell, manifestly to 
better secure him in the payment of the pur-
chase price. Apart from the requirement 
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that the residences should not be less 
than 1200 square feet each, the contract 
is incomplete in not specifying how 
many residences were to be constructed 
and is silent as to the size (except 
that each was to be 1200 square feet), 
type, location, cost, appearance or any-
other details of construction," (253 P„2d 
at 81) 
In the instant case, the trial court, un-
able to find an explicit agreement between the 
parties about materials and construction details, 
erroneously ruled that the parties reached an agree-
ment by finding it in the plans and "specificied 
extras". The court held: 
1. That by October 15 the parties were 
in "substantial agreement" about what they 
wanted in the project (Finding No. 4, R. 1574); 
and 
2. That plans and specifications "sub-
stantially reflecting" this "substantial 
agreement" had been prepared by the architect 
and had become a part of the agreement 
(Finding No. 4, R. 1575; Conclusion No. 1, 
R. 1577); and 
3. That the plans and specification, 
after October 15, included certain "specified" 
or "agreed" extras which became part of the 
parties1 agreement (Finding No. 5, R. 1574; 
Conclusion No. 1, R. 1577). 
The record shows, however, that regardless of the 
state of completion of the plans in Mr. Molen's office 
on October 15, the parties based the construction 
agreement upon the preliminary proposal outlined in 
Mr. Stangl's July 11 letter. Moreover, the plans 
and specifications were not sufficiently complete on 
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October 15 to allow the inference that they somehow 
embodied the parties1 understanding. Finally, since 
a "substantial" agreement does not make a contract, 
the trial court's finding with respect to "extras" 
must be based on an explicit agreement between the 
parties after October 15. The record shows no such 
agreement, 
(1) The Language and Intent of the October 
15 Agreement Shows that the Parties Were Referring 
Back to the July 11 Proposal to Define Its Scope and 
Meaning. 
Mr. Stangl's July 11 letter and cost break-
down sheet is attached to the construction agreement 
itself as Exhibit "C". The agreement recites that 
"Contractor has prepared the contract price based 
upon preliminary plans and specifications prepared by 
Ronald Molen, AIA." (emphasis added) Mr. Stangl 
testified that he prepared the July estimate from a 
preliminary set of plans dated May 6, 1972 (R. 549). 
The agreement recites further that "the letter 
attached hereto as Exhibit C with its attached cost 
breakdown, sets forth types of materials to be speci-
fied in the final plans and working drawings . . . ." 
Nowhere in the contract is any reference made to more 
complete plans or specifications. There is certainly 
no language in the agreement adopting or incorporating 
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any plans or specifications prepared after the July 
proposal, irrespective of whatever work the architect 
may have performed in the intervening period. It is 
clear, too, that the agreement contemplates future 
preparation of plans and specifications. 
Section 2.2 of the agreement imposes on the 
parties the duty to work together to prepare the 
final plans and specifications, an act which was to 
occur in the future, clearly requiring future agree-
ment between the parties. See Nave v. McGrane, supra. 
There is no testimony in the record that 
the parties ever discussed or considered the state of 
the plans at the time the October agreement was exe-
cuted. 
Even though the court's ruling gives special 
weight and importance to the plans purportedly in 
existence on October 15, the agreement itself does not. 
In Article IX, it provides that the plans are to be 
given lowest priority in resolving any conflict among 
the contract documents. The construction agreement, 
the General Conditions and the Supplementary General 
Conditions, respectively, were given precedence. This 
undoubtedly reflected the parties' recognition that 
the plans upon which the October agreement were based 
at the time of its execution were not definite nor 
complete enough to provide a firm foundation for reso-
lution of disputes. 
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(2) The Record Shows That the Plans and 
Specifications Were Incomplete and Uncertain on 
October 15, 
In a colloquy between defendants' counsel 
and the trial bench, defendants1 theory as to the 
plans and specifications as of the date of the 
October 15 agreement is evident: 
"MR. TANNER: . . .[T]he theory upon which 
I have approached the analysis of these items 
is that if it's in the drawings by October 15, 
[it is] part of the contract. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. TANNER: Okay. Now, the November 3 
is the closest we can come to that. So, that 
little gap, I contend is their problem, 
because they are the ones who are required 
to be certain as a scrivener. Except for that 
little gap, which Mr. Money says, you know, I 
think it's five percent of his total work, 
but in that gap there are some changes and no 
one can tell exactly which they are. So I 
am contending that by referring to the November 
3 we are entitled to an assumption that it 
is substantially the same as October 15." 
(R. 1517) 
Not only does this theory ignore the construction 
agreement, which was based on the July proposal, but 
counsel's statement concedes that it is virtually 
impossible to identify the plans and specifications 
in existence as of October 15. 
Eleven sets of plans were admitted into 
evidence at trial. Five of these sets showed the 
various stages of development of the working drawings 
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on t h e p r o j e c t . " . / These f i v e s e t s can be summarized 
as f o l l o w s : 
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Layout, floor plans, 
elevations 
Layout, floor plans, 
elevations, struc-
tural, parking ramps 
and specification 
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Layout, floor plans, 
elevations, struc-
tural, ramps, two 
sheets of mechanical 
and a specifications 
sheet 
Complete set - all 
mechanical founda-
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to November 3, 














Undated Parking ramp 
There are no plans which can definitely be 
said to have been in existence on October 15. All 
that can be said is that the November 3 plans and the 
z/oE the others, one set (Ex, 75^P) consisted of plans 
from an unrelated project used by plaintiff as an aid in preparing 
his original cost estimate (Ex. 11-D) for Dr. Todd. Four sets 
(Ex. 74-D, 6-D, 7-D and 7HD(a)), are all preliminary sketches, 
showing little or no detail. 74-D, which is essentially identical 
to 7-D and 7-D(a), was actually used by plaintiff in preparing 
his July cost estimate. 100-D reflects the work done by the 
engineer in September of 1972 in analyzing alternative floor struc-
tures for the project. 102-D and 103-D, one a sepia and one a 
vellum, are one page drawings of floor plans and represent sheets 
incorporated in more complete sets. 
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undated plans marked 101-D are those whose existence 
must closely approximate the October 15 date. Since 
the undated plans (101-D) were prepared first (R. 950), 
they must either be closer to the October 15 date or 
have actually been in existence at that time. 
Cursory physical observation reveals import-
ant differences between those two sets of plans. The 
November 3 plans are nearly twice as large, containing 
34 sheets, as compared to the undated plans, containing 
17 sheets. The former contains 4 sheets of foundation 
drawings, 7 sheets of parking ramp plans, 14 interior 
elevations, a door schedule, and a window schedule. 
The latter (Ex. 101-D) includes none of these except 
for the interior elevations, of which there are 9. 
Many of the changes are significant. For example, on 
the first page of the November 3 plans, the east side-
yard has been changed from 25 feet to 44 feet 8 inches, 
and the lobby area is 10 feet shorter. A retaining 
wall, a garbage area, parking barriers, a redwood 
fence, a brick wall around the sundeck, a driveway on 
the east end, and fire hydrants have all been added. 
The interior plans showed that a hallway at the east 
end of the corridor on the first floor of the east 
tower has been removed. In the B units, the bathrooms 
throughout have been revised, additional drywall is 
shown, 3 feet of cabinets are added, and wooden grills 
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are included in the November 3, but not in the 
earlier, plans. 
These two sets of plans were prepared 
principally by Mr. Robert Money, MolenBs draftsman, 
who was primarily responsible for the actual draft-
ing. Mr. Money did not know the status of the plans 
as of October 15 (R. 1003), He did remember that 
there were, as the plans themselves reflect, changes 
in and additions to the drawings between October 15 
and November 3 (R. 1005) .1/ Mr. Money was examined 
at some length about the items included between 
October 15 and November 3. With very few exceptions, 
he stated that he did not know when the changes were 
made (R. 1002-1019). 
After November 3, the plans themselves show 
continuous development. The court ruled that Exhibit 
9, the final February plans and specifications, 
reflects the agreement "contemplated by the parties 
as of October 15" (Finding No. 5, R. 1575). There 
were many changes in the drawings between October 15 
and the final February plans. These changes, more 
Mr. Money's work records indicate that betwaen 
October 15 and November 3 he spent approximately 88 hours on 
the Canyon Road project. (Ex. 96-D) Of this time Money felt 
that about 24 hours were devoted to "cleaning up" the November 
3 plans. The remaining 64 hours were devoted to the drawings 
the plans contained. (Ex. 78-D) 
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relevant to the subject of the claimed "extras", 
are discussed in the next section of this brief. 
Again, the physical nature of the plans themselves 
show how insubstantial the agreement on plans really 
was on October 15. The February plans contain 70 
sheets, compared to the undated plans5 17 sheets 
(Ex. 101-D), and the November 3 plans1 34 sheets. 
The February plans are complete and contain all of 
th€> mechanical, electrical and other subcontractor 
shop drawings which are found only fragmentarily or 
not at all in both the November 3 and the earlier 
plans. 
The continuing development of the plans is 
corroborated by correspondence between Ray Stoddard, 
Sherwood and Roberts1 manager, and National Life 
Insurance, the lender on the project. On October 9, 
in a letter to the company covering two sheets of 
floor plans, Stoddard states that, although the archi-
tects "are doing pretty good", many of the sheets are 
incomplete (Ex. 89-D). On October 16, Stoddard 
informed the company that the plans should be done 
in about two weeks (Ex. 90-D). On November 1, he 
said that the floor plans were being revised (Ex. 
92-D). On November 21, Stoddard sent additional plans 
to the company, reciting again that the drawings were 
not complete (Ex. 93-D). As late as November 28, 
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1972,"Mr. Curreri of the insurance company wrote to 
Stoddard thanking him for "the partially completed 
working drawings" (Ex. 94-D). Dr. Todd testified 
that on or about January 31, 1973, he received an 
irate letter from the insurance company stating that 
they were tired of the delay and demanding that the 
plans be completed forthwith (R. 43 0). 
The trial court found something that did 
not exist—namely, that the plans and specifications 
were sufficiently complete as of October 15 to "sub-
stantially reflect" the "substantial" agreement of 
the parties (Finding No. 4, R. 1575). 
(3) There Was No Agreement Concerning 
"Extras". 
Article III of the construction agreement 
provides: 
"Section 3.1 The Owner may from time to 
time, by written instructions signed by the 
Owner's Representative, issued to the Contractor, 
order work changes in the nature of additions, 
deletions or modifications, without invalidating 
the Contract, and agrees to make corresponding 
adjustments in the contract price and time of 
termination. All changes will be authorized by 
a written change order signed by the Owner's 
Representative. The change order will include 
conforming changes in the Contract and termina-
tion time. 
Work shall be changed, and the contract 
price and termination time shall be modified 
only as set out in the written change order. 
Any adjustment in the Contract sum resulting 
in a credit or a charge to the Owner shall be 
determined by mutual agreement of the parties, 
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before starting the Work involved in the 
change. Further, Owner shall pay to the 
Contractor at the time of any change order 
thirty percent (30%) of the cost of said 
change if the change increased the cost of 
the project. . . . " (emphasis added) 
This provision established the sole pro-
cedure for ordering extra work or materials through 
written change orders to be signed by the architect. 
At the time of the change order, defendants were 
required to pay the contractor 30 percent of any 
mutually agreed increase in cost resulting from the 
change. The obvious purposes of this provision were 
to specify the exact nature and cost of changes and 
to prevent misunderstanding or dispute about what 
it€>ms were to be part of the contract and what items 
were in fact to be extras. The record shows that 
the* procedures of Article III were never used; no 
chcinge orders were ever issued by the architect; no 
increased costs were ever agreed upon, no such orders 
were ever sent to plaintiff, and plaintiff was, of 
course, never paid or tendered 30 percent of such 
increased costs. In fact, as has been shown, 
defendants refused to pay anything more than the 
original contract price. 
The record shows that the parties could 
never agree on a contract price. However, not only 
was there no agreement about the price of the "extras", 
but in fact there was no agreement about what items 
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were to be included as "extras"• Only toward the 
end of the trial, when defendants realized the impos-
sibility of showing a definite contract between the 
parties based only on the October agreement, did 
they strongly assert the theory of "extras". 
None of the "agreed" or "specified" "extras" 
found by the trial court originate from an agreement 
between the parties. Dr. Todd testified that two of 
these items were discussed with Mr. Stangl—that is, 
the extra bathrooms and the laundry and storage areas 
(R. 409). Apart from the vague understanding that 
the two items would be included in the project, the 
parties never reached any agreement about their 
cost. 
Another group of "extras" not agreed upon 
by the parties consisted of items which Dr. Todd 
"understood" or "considered" as "extras". These are 
the larger swimming pool (R. 1354), the larger sauna 
(R. 1361), and the high-speed elevator (R. 1361)• 
With respect to these three items, it is clear that 
nothing like an agreement was ever reached, either as 
to price or as to their inclusion as "extras" in the 
project. Dr. Todd's testimony with respect to the 
elevators is typical: 
"Q, Then with respect to the elevators, 
.,.•.,-.•; the matter of the elevators had not been pre-
cisely fixed, had it? 
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A, No, it hadn't. 
Q. So there is a figure in the first bid 
or price of Mr. Stangl of $95,000 for the ele-
vator. And the most he ever set down as being 
charged for an elevator is $109,600. So that 
the $14,600 difference could appropriately be 
considered an extra, could it? 
A. I suppose so. I didn't think we had 
much voice in picking the elevators. We were 
leaving that up to him and the architect." 
(R. 1361). 
A third group of "extras" arises from an 
analysis of the plans rather than from any considera-
tion by the parties themselves. This category includes 
a double brick expansion wall (R. 1429), a brick wall 
(R. 1430), footing and foundations in the pool area 
(R. 1431-32), Atlas brick in the ramps (R. 1432), 
Soldier brick in the ramp (R. 1436), additional steel 
in the ramp area (R. 1436), extra fire hydrants 
(R. 1438), and built-in furniture (R. 1438). With 
these items, there is not even a pretense of an under-
standing or agreement as is demonstrated by the fact 
that the items and their costs could only be estab-
lished as "extras" by an expert witness called upon 
at trial to speculate as to what the parties had agreed 
and at what price. 
The court, without any evidence of assent 
by the parties created an agreement about the "extras" 
when in fact no agreement existed. The court's 
ruling with respect to "extras" in itself points out 
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the lack of definiteness and certainty in the pur-
ported contract.-^ Clearly Mr. Stangl could never 
have performed without an agreement concerning these 
"extras" and equally as clearly no agreement was ever 
reached. Finally, as noted, defendants were unable 
to pay for any "extras" because they had no money 
above the original $2,399,222. 
POINT II 
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE APARTMENT 
COMPLEX, RATHER THAN THE COST TO COMPLETE I T , IS THE 
PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN THIS CASE. 
Assuming t h e t r i a l c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n 
f i n d i n g a c o n t r a c t be tween t h e p a r t i e s and a b r e a c h by 
p l a i n t i f f , t h e c o u r t n e v e r t h e l e s s e r r e d i n i t s d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n of damages . These damages were measured by 
d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e c o s t t o c o m p l e t e t h e p r o j e c t would 
have been $ 2 , 9 7 0 , 4 0 0 . The c o u r t t h e n s u b t r a c t e d t h e 
c o n t r a c t p r i c e , t h e c o s t of t h e " e x t r a " i t e m s , and 
~
/
 The t r i a l court did not use i t s theor ies of 
the agreement cons is ten t ly . For example, the November 3 plans 
c lea r ly show i n t e r i o r walls of concrete block (Ex. 78-D, 
sheet 4 ) . Later the i n t e r i o r walls were changed to 8 inch 
Atlas brick (Ex. 8-D, sheet 4 ) . After t h a t , the 8 inch brick 
was changed t o 6 inch Atlas br ick, and t h i s mater ial appears 
in the f inal February plans (Ex. 9-D). Clearly t h i s item 
should have been included as an "extra" but was not . Another 
example i s the wooden g r i l l s in the B u n i t s . This item 
again did not appear in the November 3 p lans , but was included 
in the February plans . I t was not allowed as an "extra" even 
though Dr. Todd t e s t i f i e d t h a t he "understood" i t t o be one 
(R. 1357). 
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the value of the work performed by plaintiff, from 
this cost of completion. This measure of damages 
awarded defendants a substantial windfall because 
the project, if completed, would not have had a fair 
market value equal to the cost of completion figure 
adopted by the court. In addition, this measure of 
damages penalized the plaintiff because defendants 
were awarded an amount equal to plaintiff's projected 
loss, rather than equal to the benefit of their bar-
gain. 
After it became clear that the parties could 
not agree, Drs. Todd and Lignell abandoned all plans 
to erect the contemplated apartment complex. The * 
work Stangl had already performed was demolished, and 
work was commenced on a new and completely different 
project, comprising condominium units, by a different 
contractor. Dr. Todd explained that to complete the 
apartment complex at bid prices received would be 
economically unfeasible: 
"BY MR. TANNER: : 
Q. Dr. Burton (sic), did you go forward 
after giving notice, that is the letter from 
my office demanding that Mr. Stangl go ahead 
and build it the way you claim he contracted 
to build the apartments, did you thereafter go 
forward and build this twin tower apartment 
house? 
A. No, we didn't. 
Q. And why not? 
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A. Well, there were several reasons. 
Number one, we didn't have the additional 
money to build it. And on the basis of the 
rental projections which had been made, and 
which we felt were maximum, it would have 
been uneconomical to expend a greater sum on 
it. It would have been an invitation to 
economic disaster. 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Tanner) Did you make efforts 
to ascertain whether you could supplement the 
money and property which you had by borrowed 
funds, and in that fashion, achieve enough 
money to go ahead and actually build the pro-
ject even though the cost of it may be as 
projected? 
A. We did make inquiries as to whether 
more money was available. 
Q. Was there money available? 
A. No, it wasnft."(R. 481)(emphasis added) 
This is not a case of construction abandoned 
when substantial work had already been performed on 
the structure. The little work that had been completed 
was demolished after the events that the trial court 
later ruled constituted a breach on Stangl's part. 
The defendants were not put in a position where they 
were compelled to expend additional sums to finish a 
substantially completed project. It is apparent 
from defendants1 own testimony that the project was 
barely feasible at the price of the original agreement, 
let alone at any higher price. And the apartment com-
plex was obviously planned for income purposes, without 
any "personal" importance or value to the owners. 
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In these circumstances, fundamental prin-
ciples of damages for breach of contract and the 
better considered opinions require that damages be 
measured by the fair market value of the proposed 
apartment complex, not the hypothetical cost to 
complete it. 
A. The Case Law Is Clear that Cost of Com-
pletion Is an Improper Measure of Damages When the 
Owners Abandon All Plans to Complete the Improvement. 
The question before this Court is considered 
in American Surety Co. v. Woods, 105 F. 741 (5th Cir. 
1901), aff'd on reh'g, 106 F. 263 (1901). Plaintiff, 
a receiver for a sewer company, brought suit against 
the contractor's bonding company after the contractor, 
claiming he had been excused from his contractual 
obligations, refused to finish the work. After the 
repudiation, the sewer company made no attempt to com-
plete the work; and as the facts were presented to the 
appellate court it was clear the project had been 
finally and totally abandoned. The Court stated that: 
"The question to be considered is the 
charge of the court on the measure of damages. 
The instruction, in effect, was that the 
measure of damages was the difference between 
the contract price and what it would have > 
cost to finish the sewers, and that, to re-
cover this difference, it was not necessary 
for the sewerage company to complete the work." 
(105 F. at 743) 
The Court held that this instruction was error, stating: 
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. . . whatever other damages may have 
been sustained, it cannot be said, before 
the work has been completed at a greater 
cost, that the injured party has sustained 
damages to the amount of the difference 
between the contract price and the cost of 
completing the work. In the absence of legal 
defense the employer can, of course, 
recover damages for a breach of the contract 
of employment by the employe. Where the 
employe or contractor without legal cause 
abandons the work, unfinished, the right of 
the employer to sue for the breach of the 
contract is not dependent upon his completing 
the abandoned work. He may sue at once and 
recover of the employe or contractor such 
damages as under legal rules he can show he 
has sustained. But when the employer does 
not incur the expense of completing the 
abandoned work, and determines not to finish 
it, the sum that the contractor would have 
Tost had he complied with the agreement and 
finished the work, or the difference between 
the contract price and the cost of completion 
cannot be taken as the measure of damages." 
(105 F. at 746) (emphasis supplied) 
In considering an old New York case, Kidd v. 
McCormick, 83 N.Y. 391, the Fifth Circuit, in American 
Surety, said: 
"It will be observed that the [New York] 
court states that 'his damage is the differ-
ence between the value of the house furnished 
and the house as it ought to have been fur-
nished. 8 It is not held that the measure of 
"•'
x
- damages is the difference between the contract 
price and what it would have cost to finish 
the house." (105 F. at 747) (emphasis supplied) 
American Surety is obviously very similar to 
the instant case. There as here the injured owner 
abandoned all plans and determined not to finish the 
work. There as here he relied entirely on a claim that 
cost of completion is the proper measure of damages. 
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In Nello L. Teer Co, v. Hollywood Golf 
Estates, Inc., 324 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. 
denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964), American Surety was 
reaffirmed. In Teer, judgment was entered on the 
defendant owner's counterclaim against the contractor 
for breach of a contract for dredging and landfill. 
The finding of a breach was affirmed, but the damage 
award, based on cost of completion, was reversed for 
want of any evidence in the record that the owner had 
completed or intended to do so. The court stated: 
"A fairly early decision by this Court, 
American Surety Co. v. Woods, 5th Cir., 
105 F. 741 (1901), never overruled or criti-
cized, as far as we have ascertained, 
squarely held that where a construction or 
similar contract is breached by a contractor 
after partial performance, the contractee is 
not entitled automatically to recover the 
difference between the contract price and 
the amount which it would have cost to have 
the work done, unless completion actually is 
accomplished at a greater cost. While this 
case involved a Louisiana statute, the 
Court made it plain that the common law was 
to the same effect. . . . 
"We conclude, therefore, that the judg-
ment of the District Court on the question 
of quantum of damages must be reversed, and 
the case remanded for a new trial on that 
aspect. Of course, Teer is entitled to 
credit for the work it actually performed." 
(324 F.2d at 672-73) 
These two seem to be the only cases that 
have squarely considered the issue presented here: 
Is cost of completion the proper measure of damages 
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when the owner abandons all plans to complete the 
work? Both concluded that it was not. 
Defendants contended in the trial court 
that American Surety has been impugned in the Fifth 
Circuit by Wills v. Peace Creek Drainage Dist., 
4 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1925). There the contractor 
abandoned work on ditches for the drainage district 
and contended on appeal that the work must actually 
be completed before damages based on cost of comple-
tion could be awarded. American Surety was distin-
guished by the finding that: 
"The contract contains no provision for 
the completion by the drainage district of 
the work upon the abandonment of it by the 
contractors. . . . [Tjhere was no evidence in-
consistent with an intention on the part of 
the drainage district ultimately to complete 
the plan of reclamation provided for in the 
contract." (4 F.2d at 519) 
The case at hand is itself distinguishable from Wills 
in that defendants have clearly and irrevocably 
abandoned all intention of finishing the project. 
More important, the trial court in the instant case 
appears to have ignored Section 10.2 of the construc-
tion agreement (Ex. 1-P): 
". . .[W]hen the Contractor defaults in 
performance . . . the owner may take posses-
sion of the work site . . . and finish the 
work in whatever way he deems expedient . . • ." 
This provision is indistinguishable from the contract 
provisions considered in American Surety which were 
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found absent from the contract before the Wills court. 
Nevertheless, the trial court in the instant case said 
in its ruling from the bench: 
"THE COURT: . . . The American Surety 
. case, and I think Mr. Tanner's brief dis-
tinguished that, and I read it, contained a 
provision whereby his remedy in the event 
of breach was to take over and complete it. 
There is no such provision in this contract." 
(R. 1507) 
In sum, the cases that have squarely con-
sidered the issue of whether an injured owner may 
recover damages based upon cost of completion after he 
has totally and irrevocably abandoned the work and 
decided not to complete, have ruled that he cannot. 
B. The Award of Damages by the Trial Court, 
Based Upon Cost of Completion, Constitutes Economic 
Waste, Awards Defendants a Windfall and Penalizes the 
Contractor. 
Section 346 of the Restatement of Contracts 
considers the alternatives available to an injured 
owner upon a contractor's breach: 
"(1) For a breach by one who has contracted 
to construct a specified product, the other 
party can get judgment for compensatory 
damages for all unavoidable harm that the 
builder had reason to foresee when the con-
tract was made, less such part of the con-
tract price as has not been paid and is not 
still payable, determined as follows: 
(a) For defective or unfinished construction 
he can get judgment for either 
(i) the reasonable cost of construction 
and completion in accordance with the 
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contract, if this is possible and does 
not involve unreasonable economic waste; 
or 
(ii) the difference between the value 
that the product contracted for would 
have had and the value of the perform-
ance that has been received by the 
plaintiff, if construction and comple-
tion in accordance with the contract 
would involve unreasonable economic 
waste." (emphasis added) 
This section of the Restatement has often been cited 
in Utah, See, for example, Rex T. Fuhriman, Inc. v. 
Jarrell, 21 Utah 2d 298, 445 P.2d 136 (1968); and 
Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 P.2d 
197 (1969). 
Neither Section 34 6 of the Restatement, the 
comments or illustrations following it, nor any cases 
construing it, explicitly indicate the measure of dam-
ages to be applied in the situation before this Court, 
where the owners have abandoned their plans to complete 
after an insubstantial portion of the work is performed. 
However, the emphasized portions of Section 346 as set 
out above, concerning limitations on the cost of comple-
tion measure when its application would involve "economic 
waste", are applicable here. 
Comment on Subsection (1)(a) of Section 346, 
Restatementf states in part: 
"In very many cases it makes little 
difference whether the measure of recovery is 
based upon the value of the promised product 
as a whole or upon the cost of procuring or 
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constructing it piecemeal. There are numerous 
cases, however, in which the value of the 
finished product is much less than the cost of 
producing it after the breach has occurred. 
Sometimes defects in a completed structure can-
not be physically remedied without tearing down 
and rebuilding, at a cost that would be impru-
dent and unreasonable. The law does not require 
damages to be measured by a method requiring 
such economic waste. If no waste is involved, 
the cost of remedying the defect is the amount 
awarded as compensation for failure to render 
the promised performance." (emphasis added) 
As this comment and illustration to 
Subsection (1) of Section 346 indicates, "economic 
waste" is most commonly thought to consist "of the 
destruction of a substantially completed building 
or other structure". Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal 
Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 112 (Okla. 1962). However, 
the notion of economic waste cannot be rationally : 
restricted to situations where the undoing and re-
doing of work already completed is necessary. The 
concept of economic waste by itself is somewhat 
imprecise with respect to what courts are attempting 
to accomplish by awards of damages to injured prop-
erty owners. Professor Farnsworth, in "Legal 
Remedies for Breach of Contract," 70 Col. L. Rev. 
1145 (1970), states that since courts have no 
control over whether a damaged party will "waste his 
awarded damages, such "waste" may occur regardless 
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of t h e measure of damages.2/ The concept of "waste18 
r e a l l y r evo lves around whether , under the a p p l i c a b l e 
c o n t r a c t , an a s s e t would have been produced wi th a 
va lue s u b s t a n t i a l l y l e s s than the va lue of the a s s e t s 
used t o produce i t . P ro fes so r Farnsworth sums up h i s 
d i s c u s s i o n as fo l l ows : 
"Much of t he t a l k of 'economic waste 1 
thus misses the mark. Usual ly the only v a l i d 
po in t t o be made i s t h a t t h e r e i s the p roba-
b i l i t y of an exces s ive w ind fa l l for the owner 
and a heavy p e n a l t y for the b u i l d e r i f c o s t 
t o complete r a t h e r than d iminut ion in market i 
p r i c e i s adopted as a measure of l o s s in v a l u e . " 
(70 Col. L. Rev. a t 1174) (emphasis added) 
2/ " I t i s misleading, however, to suggest that 
the award of damages measured by cost to complete 
would result in 'economic waste' in such a situation 
[as demolishing a house to ins ta l l a different brand 
of pipe] . What i s meant by 'economic waste8 seems 
rather to be a use of assets in a way considered 
'wasteful' according to standards shared by the 
society in general. Certainly there would have been 
'economic waste' in th is sense if the contractor in 
Jacob & Young [v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (1921)] had 
been compelled to replace the Cohoes pipe with Reading 
a t a cost generally in excess of what society in 
general, as evidenced by the market, would regard as 
the resulting increase in value. But awarding damages 
measured by cost to complete results in no such com-
pulsion, for the law does not supervise the injured 
par ty 's disposition of the money that he recovers as 
substitutional rel ief . If he recovers a sum measured 
by cost to complete, he i s free to choose whether he 
will 'waste i t ' on completion or put i t to other use. 
Even if he will l imit i t to a lesser sum ireasured by 
diminution of market price, he will s t i l l be free to 
waste i t along with other assets, on completion, and 
i t i s doubtful that recovery of the larger sum will 
appreciably increase the likelihood that he will do so. 
. . ."(70 Col. L. Rev. a t 1173-74) (emphasis in original; 
footnotes omitted) 
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Defendants in this case failed to meet their 
burden of proving that the fair market value of the 
apartment complex, as contemplated, would have equalled 
or exceeded the original contract price. To the extent 
that the cost to complete exceeded the fair market 
value of the completed project, the damages awarded 
defendants were a windfall to the defendants in that 
amount. Suppose, for example, the contract price is 
$1,000, the market value of the finished improvement is 
$1,100, and the cost to complete the improvement is 
$1,200. If the contract is performed, the owner would 
be benefited by $100 (market value minus contract price). 
The contractor would have lost $200 (cost to complete 
minus contract price). But if the contractor breaches 
and the owner abandons all plans to complete construc-
tion, it makes no sense to award the owner the contractor's 
losses.—' If the contract were performed he would be 
benefited by only $100, not $200. The additional $100 
would be nothing more than a windfall to him and a 
Clearly such an award violates: 
"the general principle which underlies the ascertain-
ment of damages for breach of contract: that the non-
breaching party should receive an award which will 
put him in as good a position as he would have been 
in had there been no breach." Keller v. Deseret 
Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 3, 455 P.2d 197 (1969) 
(emphasis added); also, Fleming v. Scott, 348 P.2d 
701 (Colo. 1960). 
-48-
penalty to the contractor. The law countenances 
neither. 
If Mr. Stangl had terminated construction 
after substantial work had been performed on the 
apartment complex, leaving the defendants with no 
choice but to complete, then this "windfall" objec-
tion to cost of completion damages would be obviated. 
The difference between the market value and cost of 
completion would be a proximate and foreseeable result 
of the breach, the cost of which Mr. Stangl could 
justly be made to bear. But as the matter stands 
under the trial court's award, Stangl is required to 
compensate the defendants for a loss they failed to 
prove and to make them whole for gains they never 
proved they would have realized had the contract been 
performed, Stangl is in effect "subsidizing" a 
losing project. As Professor Farnsworth points out, 
such a result is questionable enough when the project 
is completed; it is unconscionable when the project 
is abandoned. 
C. The Record and Findings Contain No 
Evidence of a Willful Breach as Distinguished From a 
Good Faith Disagreement as to the Plaintiff's Obliga-
tions Under the Contract, 
i • • ! •• • • '• ' • - • * • 
"Willful" or "bad faith" breaches have often 
been the basis for a cost of completion measure of 
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damages, even if the damages have punitive or exemp-
lary qualities. See, e.g., V. C. Edwards Contracting 
Co., Inc. v. Port of Tacoma, 83 Wash. 2d 7, 514 P.2d 
1381 (1973); and Shell v. Schmidt, 164 Cal. App. 2d 
350, 330 P.2d 817, 76 A.L.R. 2d 792 (1958). 
The record in this case shows that the dis-
pute between Stangl and the doctors concerning the 
terms and conditions of their agreement was in good 
faith. The contract between them was never clearly 
defined. Protracted negotiations were held between 
the parties before it was decided that Mr. Stangl 
would not recommence the work. Thus, the record affords 
no basis for a finding of "willfulness" or "bad faith" 
on plaintiff's part, and the trial court made no such 
finding. 
Even when the breach is willful or in bad 
faith, there are cases going both ways. In Groves v. 
John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939), 
the owner leased a 24-acre tract of property to the 
contractor with the right to excavate. The lease 
price was $105,000, and the lessee agreed to leave the 
property with an even grade upon completion of its 
excavation. The contractor left the grade uneven and 
the evidence at trial showed that to do the necessary 
grading to even it up would cost $60,000, whereas the 
fair market value of the property with an even grade 
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was $12,160. The trial court awarded the latter 
sum. The appellate court reversed awarding damages 
of $60,000. The reversal was based in part on the 
willful breach. 
• In an Oklahoma case, Peevyhouse v. Garland 
Coal Mining Co., supra, the owners of a farm leased 
it for strip mining purposes with the stipulation in 
the lease agreement that the land would be restored 
to its original contours upon completion. Again, the 
contractor abandoned the land without restoring it to 
its original contours. The evidence at trial showed 
that the fair market value of the farm with even con-
tours was $300 while the cost of completing the work 
would be $29,000. The trial court awarded damages of 
$5,000, which on appeal the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
reduced to $3 00. 
Each of these almost identical cases arrived 
at the opposite result with respect to the proper 
measure of damages. A fair inference would be that 
the contractor in Peevyhouse, assessing his cost to 
complete the work against the damages that the owner 
might incur, made a more or less "willful" choice to 
breach the contract.—' Thus, Peevyhouse presented a 
—' The Peevyhouse majority seems to have ignored 
the owners1 arguments that bad faith was involved, although the 
dissenters in that case thought it was. 
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much stronger case for awarding cost of completion 
than the instant case. Nevertheless, the Court 
refused to use this measure of damages. 
D. The Apartment Complex Was Income Prop-
erty, and Its Value to Defendants Must Be Measured 
in Terms of Its Value for Such Commercial Purposes. 
Illustration 4 to Restatement of Contracts, 
§ 346, states: 
"A contracts to construct a monumental 
fountain in B's yard for $5,000, but abandons 
the work after the fountain has been laid and 
$2,800 has been paid by B. The contemplated 
fountain is so ugly that it would decrease 
the number of possible buyers of the place. 
The cost of completing the fountain would 
be $4,000. B can get judgment for $1,800, 
the cost of completion less the part of the 
price unpaid." 
In such circumstances, where the improvement 
confers some special personal benefit on its owner, 
cost of completion may be a fair measure of damages. 
As Professor Farnsworth puts it: 
"Damages measured by the diminution in 
the price that Owner could realize on the 
market, . . . avoid the above objection [that 
Owner would obtain a windfall], but are sub-
ject to the converse objection that they may 
undercompensate Owner. If Owner planned to 
keep the building for his own use, the advant-
age that he expected may well exceed that to 
those who would buy on the market. As Bonbright 
pointed out, 
"'many properties, highly priced for 
the special purposes for which they are 
designed, are of trivial value [on the 
market] because only the present owner is 
in a position to exploit them.1" (70 Col. 
L. Rev. at 1168) 
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The foregoing arguments are inapplicable 
in the instant case because the contemplated apart-
ment complex was obviously income property to be 
exploited for commercial purposes (R. 481). Its 
value for such purposes is its fair market value, and 
it conferred no other special personal value on the 
defendants. 
E. A Useful Standard for Determining Whether 
Cost to Complete or Diminution in Value Should Be Used 
as the Measure of Damages Is Whether the Work Was 
Substantially Performed. 
The state of Washington is one jurisdiction 
which has adopted a consistent general rule for deter-
mining whether cost of completion or diminution in value 
should be the proper measure of damages upon a con-
tractor's breach. In Forrester v. Craddock, 317 P.2d 
1077 (Wash. 1957), the Supreme Court of Washington stated: 
"For the reasons stated in White v. 
Mitchell, 1923, 123 Wash. 630, 213 P. 10, 
13, this court has consistently followed 
the principles therein announced: 
»• i * * * Where the builder has sub-
stantially complied with his contract, 
the measure of damages to the owner 
would be what it would cost to com- .-'••'• 
plete the structure as contemplated 
by the contract. * * * Generally, 
where there has not been such sub-
stantial performance, the measure 
of the owner's damage is the differ-
ence between the value of the build-
ing as constructed and its value had 
it been constructed in accordance 
with the contract.'" (317 P.2d at 1082) 
(emphasis added) 
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The Washington court was considering a 
case where "substantial performance" turn in part 
upon considerations of undoing and redoing work 
already performed. The important point, however, is 
that even though cost of completion may award a 
windfall to the owner, it is arguable it should be 
used only where completion of the project is neces-
sary and foreseeable in order to avoid a larger 
economic waste. In our case, however, where only 
1.5 percent of the cost was incurred, it cannot be 
said that there was substantial performance. 
Whether the end to be obtained is the pre-
vention of "economic waste" or the prevention of un-
necessary windfalls to the owners and unfair penal-
ties to the contractor, fair market value is the 
reasonable and proper standard by which the value 
lost to the owner should be measured. Defendants 
failed to meet their burden of proving the fair 
market value of the completed project. 
CONCLUSION 
The record is clear that when the parties 
executed the October agreement they had not yet 
entered an enforceable construction contract. Many 
specific items of construction remained to be agreed 
upon. It is clear that with respect to these items 
the parties never agreed either upon price or upon 
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what the items themselves should be. Without any 
agreement on these items, the October agreement 
remained vague and indefinite and the parties could 
not have performed under it. It was error for the 
trial court to rule that agreement was reached as 
to these additional items, or "extras", when in fact 
the record is clear that no such agreement was ever 
made. 
Even if an enforceable construction contract 
had been entered, the trial court erred by using cost 
of completion as the measure of damages when the 
defendant owners have no intention of ever completing 
the project. The proper measure in such circumstances 
is the fair market value the apartment complex would 
have had upon completion. The measure used awards 
defendants a windfall and penalizes plaintiff. Defend-
ants failed completely in meeting their burden of 
showing the fair market value of the apartment complex. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial 
court should be vacated and judgment entered for the 
plaintiff for the value of the work he performed. In 
the alternative, the case should be remanded for a new 
trial on the issue of damages. 
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